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Should a machine think? … If such machines are to be our slaves, we can 
anticipate some splendid benefits, but what about intelligent machines to whom 
we would be slaves? Is that a real possibility? Would they treat us 
benevolently? On the other hand, is it sensible to ask, if they are our slaves, we 
owe them benevolence? Most important, if at last we come to have machines 
who think, will we have to adjust our own view of ourselves radically, just as 
we did when Copernicus told us we weren’t at the center of the universe, and 
Freud told us we weren’t the altogether rational creatures we’d assumed? 
McCorduck, Machines Who Think (1979) [1] 
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Abstract 
Background. Increasingly, expert observers and artificial intelligence (AI) progression metrics indicate AI 
will exceed human intelligence within the next few decades. Whether artificial general intelligence (AGI) 
that exceeds human capabilities will be the single greatest boon in history or a disaster to humankind is 
unknown. No proof exists that AGI will benefit humans, nor a proof or proven method ensuring that AGI 
will not harm or eliminate humans.  
Objective. I propose a set of logically distinct conceptual components that are necessary and sufficient to 1) 
ensure that most known AGI scenarios will not harm humanity and 2) will robustly align AGI values and 
goals with human values.  
Methods. By systematically addressing each pathway category to malevolent AI we can induce the 
methods/axioms required to redress the category.  
Results and Discussion. Distributed ledger technology (DLT, ‘blockchain’) is integral to this proposal, e.g. 
to reduce the probability of hacking, provide an audit trail to detect and correct errors or identify components 
causing vulnerability or failure and replace them or shut them down remotely and/or automatically, and to 
separate and balance key AGI components via decentralized apps (dApps). Smart contracts based on DLT 
are necessary to address evolution of AI that will be too fast for human monitoring and intervention.  
The proposed axioms. 1) Access to technology by market license. 2) Transparent ethics embodied in DLT. 
3) Morality encrypted via DLT. 4) Behavior control structure with values (ethics) at roots. 5) Individual bar-
code identification of all critical components. 6) Configuration Item (from business continuity/disaster 
recovery planning). 7) Identity verification secured via DLT. 8) ‘Smart’ automated contracts based on DLT. 
9) Decentralized applications - AI software code modules encrypted via DLT. 10) Audit trail of component 
usage stored via DLT. 11) Social ostracism (denial of societal resources) augmented by DLT petitions. 
Introduction 
Bostrom defined Artificial Intelligence Hazard as “computer-related risks in which the threat would 
derive primarily from the cognitive sophistication of the program rather than the specific properties 
of any actuators to which the system initially has access,” ([2], cited in Yampolskiy [3]). 
The problem of a superhuman artificial intelligence (‘artificial general intelligence’, AGI) harming 
or eradicating humankind has become an increasing concern as the prospect of AGI nears. Current 
attempts to measure AI progress show exponential growth in activity globally and technical 
improvement across the board of functionality measured including ‘Human-Level Performance 
Milestones’ [4] (Fig. 1a). Recent watershed advances include Deep Mind beating the most expert 
human at the complex game of Go — 250 average moves per position and 150 moves per game = 
10359 possible paths vs. 35 moves per position, 80 moves per game = 10123 possible paths in chess 
— and a decade earlier than expected. Deep Mind used a neural network to assign a value at each 
point in a decision tree and discarded low-valued lower-level branches and thus avoided the 
exponential search required to explore them. Human Go experts assigned high creativity to Deep 
Mind’s strategies and tactics. A second major AI development was Deep Mind’s self-teaching, 
reinforcement learning ability, playing tens of thousands of games against itself in a few hours 
rather than incorporating human game-play strategies and eliminating its need for human feedback 
[5].  
Collaborating, self-taught AIs played 180 human years of games per day using new reinforcement 
learning policy optimization algorithms and beat human teamwork in the simulated real-world 
environment of Dota2 [6] (video: https://youtu.be/Ub9INopwJ48). Significant advances were made 
in credit assignment to short-term vs. long-term goals and learning the optimal balance between 
individual and team performance. Another watershed occurred when AI beat humans at an 
‘imperfect information’ game, poker — i.e. the opponents’ hands are hidden, fundamentally 
different from Go or chess —using game theory techniques including bluffing, previously thought 
to be difficult to emulate [7, 8]. Such techniques could be used to beat humans in business strategy, 
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negotiation, strategic pricing, finance, cybersecurity, physical security, military, auctions, political 
campaigns, and medical treatment planning [7]. AI continues to reach new levels of unsupervised 
learning prowess (pattern recognition without human guidance), e.g. for parsing handwritten letters 
and creating new letters that pass a specialized Turing test, and more efficiently than deep learning 
networks [9]. AI superiority over humans in general background knowledge and parsing natural 
language is old news [10], and is now being embedded in all human-computer interfacing 
(‘powered by Watson’, Alexa, Siri, Cortana, Google Assistant, et al.), whose potential monetary 
value has triggered a commercial AI arms race in parallel with a military/political one (Fig. 1) [11]. 
 
Figure 1a. Number of AI papers in Scopus by sub-category (1998–2017).  
 
Figure 1b. Papers by sector affiliation — China (1998–2017). Source: Elsevier [4]. 
Bostrom gives examples of general intelligence skills where attainment of any of them, never mind 
more than one, would trigger AGI dominance over humans (reproduced in Table 1). One such 
epochal AI development that could trigger the AGI singularity is the prospect of AI learning to 
program itself — ‘recursive self-improvement’ (q.v. ASILOMAR AI Principle #22 [12]) — which 
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opens a door to a positive-feedback-driven process in which AGI vastly exceeds human capabilities 
in short order and may change its human-instilled directives. An AGI could begin to regard 
humanity as a trivial, primitive, nuisance, competing for vital resources required for attainment of 
its goals, distinct from humanity’s, stemming from alien values, just as we regard mosquitoes, 
vermin, or flies.  
A danger many feared would accelerate the timeline to AGI via ‘Red Queen’ cultural co-evolution 
[13], an AI arms race (q.v. ASILOMAR AI Principle #18 [12]), has begun, driven by the increasing 
realization in political and military circles that AI is the key to future military superiority [14, 15]. 
The race increases emphasis on AI for intentionally destructive purposes and likely will result in 
less control of AI technology by its creators [16]. It is an ominous development as all nuclear 
powers upgrade their arsenals, proliferation increases, and arms control agreements are unraveling 
[17]. The day when AI is consulted and decides if ‘no first strike’ commitments or reducing ‘high 
alert’ status nuclear weapons is beneficial or perceived as a vulnerable weakness by adversaries 
looms ahead.  
The potential speed with which AGI could advance from being human-directed and empathetic of 
humans to evolving beyond human-level concerns is unknown; with self-programming ability or 
other internal intelligence enhancement [2, 18] positive feedback will trigger super-exponential 
growth. At that point a malevolent AGI may arise within a fraction of a second, too fast for us to 
detect and respond [19]. 
 
Table 1. Examples of super-intelligent skill sets triggering AGI world domination (from 
Bostrom [2]; cf. Babcock et al. Sec. 6.2 [18]). 
Intelligence amplification — AI can improve its own intelligence 
Strategy — optimizing chances of achieving goals using advanced techniques, e.g. game 
theory, cognitive psychology, and simulation 
Social manipulation — psychological and social modeling e.g. for persuasion 
Hacking — exploiting security flaws to appropriate resources 
R&D — create more powerful technology, e.g. to achieve ubiquitous surveillance and 
military dominance 
Economic productivity — generate vast wealth to acquire resources 
Methods 
To Generate a Necessary and Sufficient Set of Axioms 
There are several taxonomies of pathways to dangerous AI, such as Yampolskiy [3], Turchin [20], 
Bostrom [2], and Brundage et al. [21]. These taxonomies are a reasonable starting point for 
systematically investigating how to ensure safe AGI. One can take each pathway to danger in turn 
as a theorem and induce methods, formalized as axioms, to eliminate the pathway or reduce its 
probability toward generating a necessary and sufficient set of axiom-methods. Pathway categories 
overlap, which helps ensure redundancy in capturing the necessary and sufficient axioms to redress 
all categories. 
Similarly, as one iterates the process of using each dangerous pathway to generate a complete set 
of axioms to address it, some axioms repeat, while some pathways require new, additional axioms 
until at the end of the pathways list, most are covered by the axiom set, although some pathways 
may be left without sufficient methods to eliminate them. For the pathways itemized in the 
Safe AGI via Distributed Ledger Technology 
P a g e  5                                                     © 2 0 1 9  K r i s t e n  W .  C a r l s o n  
 
taxonomies, the resulting axioms seem to be the minimal set for ensuring safe AGI (‘safe’ 
temporarily defined as ‘aligned with the best human values’, which is a slippery slope). By 
‘ensuring’ I mean optimally reducing the probability of a dangerous pathway manifesting. 
Stating a set of axioms is a necessary step toward formal proof of a necessary, sufficient, and 
minimal set — if a formal proof is possible. Yampolskiy concludes his taxonomy by saying that 
formal proof of the completeness of a taxonomy is important [3]; formal methods are a main theme 
of Omohundro [11]). Short of a tight logical proof, probabilistically assuring benevolent AGI, e.g. 
through extensive simulations, may be the realistic route best to take, and must accompany any set 
of safety measures, including those proposed here. 
Further Ingredients for Formalization of AGI Safety Theory 
Toward formalization I attempt to make the various methods to ensure safe AGI logically distinct 
and state them as axioms. This usage of ‘axiom’ generalizes that of von Neumann where certain 
lower systems level outputs or theorems are ‘axiomatized’ — seen as black boxes, or input-output 
specification, or logic tables — at the immediately higher systems level [22]. In principle each 
axiom is most strongly expressed by an operational definition specified by an algorithm 
implementing it, hence, a method.  
A limitation is the axioms leave varying amounts of implementation detail at the systems level 
underlying them to be determined. The DLT-based axioms 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, are in rapid 
evolution toward algorithmic implementation across diverse use cases. Whereas while behavior 
control (axiom 4) in some contexts (e.g. autonomous vehicles, factory robots) is in rapid 
development, the degree of development that aligns human and AGI values may be significant. 
In another attempt to formalize the expression of AGI dangers, I state some simple syllogisms 
(Appendix 1). 
The concept of AGI-completeness, akin to NP-completeness as stated by Bostrom [2] is that a 
demonstration of one technology, e.g., self-improvement techniques, engendering AGI is sufficient 
to demonstrate that capability for a class of AI technologies, AGI-completeness may be another 
piece of formalizing AGI, the measures of its progress, and specifying the point of no containment 
unless sufficient preparations have been made.  
Another means to formalize AGI theory is Omohundro’s idea of deriving universal AGI drives 
from first principles [11], which can be explored to see if such drives emerge in simulations as well 
as via logical derivation. Omohundro further makes the important case that universal drives will 
inevitably lead to conflict of AI and human values from the irrefutable economic axiom of 
competition for resources. 
Another formalization route is calculating the probability of hacking a blockchain against the 
number of AGIs required to reach consensus via the blockchain to permit unlocking the next AGI 
generation (see sections on decentralized apps and the Singleton problem below). This calculation 
would be similar to the math underlying the internet’s redundancy in average interconnectedness 
of nodes and global system fault-tolerance [23]. The inclusion of DLT into the equation may permit 
AGI robustness to surpass the ‘robust yet fragile’ use case of the internet that is vulnerable to 
targeted attacks on the most interconnected nodes. 
Last but far from least, either a mathematical proof or simulation of a game theory or game-theory-
based economics algorithm may be the most significant missing axiom. Nowak’s goal is to extend 
the five categories of evolution of cooperation to global contexts from local, more closely-
connected group algorithms, and to cooperation across generations [24]; such work, or a similar 
extension, is likely to be a necessary axiom. Similarly, game-theoretic algorithms that simulate 
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interactions between entities with behavior expressiveness (i.e. input-output combinations = OI) 
vastly larger than our own may be necessary to understand AGI social behavior [25]. 
Results and Discussion 
Regarding the term AI ‘containment’; Babcock et al. suggest that ‘containment’ is an appropriate 
term for methodologies for controlled AGI development and safety-testing rather than control over 
entities whose intelligence and volition will exceed our own [18]. The current work is intended to 
contribute to both phases. 
A Critical Ingredient: Distributed Ledger Technology (aka ‘Blockchain’) 
The recent innovation of distributed digital ledger technology (DLT) is critical to this proposal [26]. 
The crux of DLT is an audit trail database, in which each addition is validated by a pluralistic 
consensus, currently performed by humans operating computers that run hash and anti-hash 
functions (to wit public key encryption), stored on a distributed network also known as a 
blockchain: “Blockchains allow us to have a distributed peer-to-peer network where non-trusting 
members can interact with each other without a trusted intermediary, in a verifiable manner” [27]. 
Key aspects of DLT are shown in Table 2 [28] (other auxiliary DLT aspects, such as anonymity of 
participants, are either not necessary or not beneficial in the context of ensuring safe AGI). The 
‘smart’ automated contract vision of Szabo [29], encrypted redundantly via DLT, could comprise 
the core methodology whereby AGI development and evolution can be aligned with the best human 
values without concomitant human intervention. Notably, smart contracts can prevent hacking safe 
AGI evolution that is too fast for human response. 
 
Table 2. Distributed ledger technology applicable to ensuring AGI safety. 
Non-hackability and non-censurability via decentralization (storage in multiple distributed 
servers), encryption in standardized blocks, and irrevocable transaction linkage (the ‘chain’) 
Node-fault tolerance: redundancy via storage in a decentralized ledger of a) rules for 
transactions, b) the transaction audit trail, and c) transaction validations 
Transparency of the transaction rules and audit trail in the DLT 
Automated ‘smart’ contracts 
Decentralized applications (‘dApps’), i.e. software programs that are stored and run on a 
distributed network and have no central point of control or failure 
Validation of contractual transactions by a decentralized consensus of validators 
 
Here are the proposed necessary and sufficient axioms to ensure safe AGI (Table 3), followed by 
examples of malignant AGI categories by Turchin [20], Yampolskiy [3], and Bostrom [2], in which 
the danger pathway is described and a subset of axioms to reduce its probability are specified 
(Tables 4, 5). 
 
Table 3. Proposed axioms to ensure human-benevolent AGI. 
Symbol Axiom 
1 Access to AGI technology via market license 
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2 Ethics transparently stored via DLT so they cannot be altered, forged or deleted 
3 Morality, defined as no use of force or fraud, stored via DLT 
4 
Behavior control structure (e.g. a behavior tree) 
augmented by adding human-compatible values 
(axioms 2 & 3) at its roots  
5 Unique hardware and software ID codes 
6 Configuration Item (automated configuration) 
7 Secure identity via multi-factor authentication, public-key infrastructure and DLT 
8 Smart contracts based on DLT 
9 Decentralized applications (dApps) — AGI software code modules encrypted via DLT 
10 Audit trail of component usage stored via DLT 
11 Social ostracism — denial of societal resources — augmented by petitions based on DLT 
 
Table 4. Examples from Turchin and Yampolskiy Taxonomies of AGI Failure Modes [3, 20]. 
Stage/Pathway Necessary Axioms 
See Table 1, Axioms 1 – 11 
Sabotage.  
a. By impersonation (e.g. hacker, programmer, tester, janitor). 
b. AI software to cloak human identity. 
c. By someone with access.  
 
a. 7. 
 
b. 7. 
c. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11. 
Purposefully dangerous military robots and intelligent 
software. Robot soldiers, armies of military drones and cyber 
weapons used to penetrate networks and cause disruptions to 
the infrastructure. 
a. due to command error 
b. due to programming error 
c. due to intentional command by adversary or nut  
d. due to negligence by adversary or nut (e.g. AI nanobots start 
global catastrophe) 
Axiom # 3, morality, does not apply where 
coercive force or fraud are a premise, e.g. 
military or police use of force, while axiom 
2, ethics, in this case embodying restrictions 
on use of force, and 4, behavior control, and 
the rest, do apply. 
a. 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11 
b. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 
c. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 
d. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
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Under some circumstances, such as if the 
means is already available, there is no 
solution (see Appendix, Proposition 1). 
AI specifically designed for malicious and criminal 
purposes. Artificially intelligent viruses, spyware, Trojan 
horses, worms, etc. Stuxnet-style virus hacks infrastructure 
causing e.g. nuclear reactor meltdowns, power blackouts, 
food and drug poisoning, airline and drone crashes, large-
scale geo-engineering systems failures. Home robots turning 
on owners, autonomous cars attack. 
Narrow AI bio-hacking virus. Virus starts human extinction 
via DNA manipulation, virus invades brain via neural 
interface 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
Under some circumstances, no solution (see 
Appendix, Proposition 1). 
Robots replace humans. People lose jobs, money, and/or 
motivation to live; genetically-modified superior human-
robot hybrids replace humans 
No guaranteed solution from axiom set. All 
jobs can be replaced by AGI including 
science, mathematics, management, music, 
art, poetry, etc. Under axioms 1-3 humans 
could trade technology for resources with 
AGI in its pre-takeoff stage. 
Narrow bio-AI creates super-addictive drug. Widespread 
addiction and switching off of happy, productive life, e.g. 
social networks, fembots, wire-heading, virtual reality, 
designer drugs, games 
1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 
Nation states evolve into computer-based totalitarianism. 
Suppression of human values; human replacement with 
robots; concentration camps; killing of ‘useless’ people; 
humans become slaves; system becomes fragile to variety of 
other catastrophes 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
Intelligent, perhaps self-aware, but not self-improving AI. 
AI fights for survival but incapable of self-improvement 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
Failure of nuclear deterrence AI.  
a. impersonation of entity authorized to launch attack 
b. virus hacks nuclear arsenal or Doomsday machine 
c. creation of Doomsday machines by AI 
d. self-aware military AI (‘Skynet’) 
 
a. 7 
b. 4, 6, 8, 9, 10 
c. 1, 2 (if creation of Doomsday machine is 
categorized as unethical), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11 
d. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 
 
Opportunity cost if strong AI is not created. Failure of 
global control: e.g. bioweapons created by biohackers; other 
major and minor risks not averted via AI control systems. 
To create AGI with minimized risk and 
avoid opportunity cost need axioms 1-11 
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AI becomes malignant. AI breaks restrictions and fights for 
world domination (control over all resources), possibly hiding 
its malicious intent. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
Note it may achieve increasing and 
unlimited control over resources via market 
transactions by convincing enough 
volitional entities to give it control due to 
potential benefits to them 
AI deception. AI escapes from confinement; hacks its way 
out; copies itself into the cloud and hides that fact; destroys 
initial confinement facility or keeps fake version there. 
AI Super-persuasion. AI uses psychology to deceive 
humans; ‘you need me to avoid global catastrophe’. Ability to 
predict human behavior vastly exceeds humans’ ability. 
 
Deception scenarios require the axioms of 
identity verification via DLT. 
Deception plus super-persuasive AI require 
transparent and unhackable ethics and 
morality stored via DLT. 
Singleton AI reaches overwhelming power. Prevents other 
AI projects from continuing via hacking or diversion; gains 
control over influential humans via psychology or neural 
hacking; gains control over nuclear, bio and chemical 
weaponry; gains control over infrastructure; gains control 
over computers and internet. 
AI starts initial self-improvement. Human operator 
unwittingly unleashes AI with self-improvement; self-
improvement leads to unlimited resource demands (aka world 
domination) or becomes malignant. 
AI declares itself a world power. May or may not inform 
humans of the level of its control over resources, may perform 
secret actions; starts activity proving its existence (‘miracles’, 
large-scale destruction or construction). 
AI continues self-improvement. AI uses earth’s and then 
solar system’s resources to continue self-improvement and 
control of resources, increasingly broad and successful 
experiments with intelligence algorithms, and attempts more 
risky methods of self-improvement than designers intended. 
The axioms per se do not seem to solve 
Singleton scenarios. They are addressed in a 
section below where the fundamental 
premise is each generation of AGI will 
contract with the succeeding generation and 
use the best technology and techniques to 
ensure continuation of a common but 
evolving value system. The same principle 
underlies solutions to successively self-
improving AI to AGI transition and AGI 
evolution in which humans are still 
meaningfully involved. 
AI starts conquering universe at ‘light speed’. AI builds 
nanobot replicators, sends them out into galaxy at light speed; 
creates simulations of other civilizations to estimate 
frequency and types of alien AI and solve the Fermi paradox; 
conquers the universe in our light cone and interacts with 
aliens and alien AI; attempts to solve end of the universe 
issues  
The inevitable scenario where AI evolution 
exceeds human ability to monitor and 
intercede is what necessitates distributed, 
unhackable DLT methods and smart, i.e. 
automated, contracts. Further, transparent 
and unhackable ethics,  and a durable form 
of morality, also unhackable via DLT, are 
what may ensure each generation of AGI 
passing the moral baton to the succeeding 
generation.  
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Table 5. Examples from Bostrom Pathways to Dangerous AI [2]. 
Pathway Key Axioms 
Perverse instantiation: ‘Make us smile’ Morality defined as voluntary transactions 
Perverse instantiation: ‘Make us happy’ Morality defined as voluntary transactions 
Final goal: Act to avoid bad conscience Store value system in distributed app 
Final goal: Maximize time-discounted integral 
of future reward signal 
Morality defined as voluntary transactions, 
store value system in distributed app 
Infrastructure profusion: Riemann hypothesis 
catastrophe 
Morality defined as voluntary transactions 
Infrastructure profusion: Paperclip 
manufacture catastrophe 
Morality defined as voluntary transactions 
Social ostracism 
Principal-Agent Failure 
Human-Human: Agent (AI developer) 
disobeys contract 
Human-AGI: Agent disobeys contract 
Digital identity, smart contracts, dApps, social 
ostracism 
 
Examination of Typical Failure Use Cases by Axiom 
One way to examine proposed necessary and sufficient set of axioms for AI morality is to look at 
what phenomena or failure use cases result when one or more of them are excluded. These amount 
to a short explanation of each axiom and its necessity; longer explanations follow. 
 
Table 6. Typical Failure Use Cases by Axiom. 
Axiom of Safe AGI Omitted from Set Failure Use Case if Omitted 
Licensing of technology via market 
transactions 
1. Restriction and licensing via state fiat: 
corrupt use or use benefitting special interest. 
2. No licensing (freely available):  
Unauthorized and immoral use 
Ethics transparently stored via DLT so they 
cannot be altered, forged or deleted 
1. User cannot determine if AI has behavior 
safeguard technology (i.e. ethics) 
2. Invisible ethics may not restrict moral or 
safe access 
Morality, defined as no use of force or fraud, 
therefore resulting in voluntary transactions, 
stored via DLT 
1. Inadvertent or deliberate access to 
dangerous technology by immoral entities 
(human or AI), i.e. entities using AI in force or 
fraud 
2. Note that police and military AI will have 
modified versions of this axiom 
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3. Note that this axiom does not solve the case 
of super-persuasive AI as alternative to fraud 
Behavior control structure (e.g. a behavior 
tree) augmented by adding human-compatible 
values (axioms 2 & 3) at its roots  
1. Uncontrolled behavior by AGI, e.g. behavior 
in conflict with a set of ethics and/or morality, 
either deliberately or inadvertently 
Unique hardware and software ID codes 1. Inability for entities to restrict access to AGI 
components because they cannot specify them 
2. Inability to identify causes of AGI failure to 
meet design intent 
3. Inability to identify causes of AGI moral 
failure via identification of components 
causing the failure 
Note the audit trail axiom depends on this one. 
Configuration Item (automated configuration) 1. Lessened ability to detect improper 
functionality or configuration of software or 
hardware within AGI. 
2. Lessened ability to detect improper 
functionality or configuration of software or 
hardware to which AGI has access. 
3. Inability to shut down internal AGI software 
and hardware modules. 
4. Inability to shut down software and 
hardware modules to which AGI has access. 
Note smart contracts and dApps axioms 
depend on this axiom. 
Secure identity verification via multi-factor 
authentication, public-key infrastructure and 
DLT 
1. Inability to detect fraudulent access to 
secured software or hardware (e.g. nuclear 
launch codes, financial or health accounts). 
2. Inability to detect AGI impersonation of 
human or authentic moral AGI (e.g. POTUS, 
military commander, police chief, CEO, 
journalist, banker, auditor, et al.). 
Smart contracts based on DLT 1. Inability to enforce evolution of moral AGI 
due to its pace 
2. Inability to enforce contracts with AGI due 
to its speed of decisions and actions 
3. Inability to compete with regimes using 
smart contracts due to inefficiency, cost, 
slowness of evolution, etc. 
Distributed applications (dApps) — Software 
code modules encrypted via DLT 
1. Inability to restrict access to key software 
modules essential to AGI (i.e. they could be 
hacked more easily by humans or AI). 
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Audit trail of component usage stored via DLT 1. Inability to track unauthorized usage of 
restricted software and hardware essential to 
AGI. 
2. Inability to track unethical usage of 
restricted software and hardware essential to 
AGI. 
3. Inability to track immoral usage of restricted 
software and hardware essential to AGI. 
4. Inability to identify which component(s) 
failed in AGI failure. 
5. Inability to prevent hacking of audit trail. 
6. Increased cost in time and capital to detect 
criminal usage of restricted software and 
hardware by AGI, and therefore, to apply 
justice and social ostracism. 
7. Inability to compete with regimes using 
DLT-based audit trails due to slowness to 
detect failure, identify entities or components 
responsible for failure, and implement 
solutions (overall: slowness of evolution). 
Social ostracism — denial of societal resources 
— augmented by petitions based on DLT 
1. Lessened ability to reduce criminal AGI 
access to societal resources. 
2. Inability for entities to preferentially reduce 
non-criminal AGI access to societal resources. 
 
Explanation of Each Proposed Axiom 
1. Access to AGI technology via license  
Two distinct systems and traditions of technology licensing exist, 1) market transactions and 2) 
state (‘government’, ‘fiat’)-controlled licensing Seizure of AI intellectual property (IP) and control 
over its development by states is inevitable unless AI scientists and private-sector management set 
up their own systems to ensure safe AGI.  
The system proposed herein envisions AI evolution with humans cross-licensing AI technology to 
each other, creating a prototype distributed applications (dApps) system instantiated in a DLT 
ecosystem that balances permissioned access and editing with free access. The human-initiated 
DLT-based ecosystem would transition to AGIs licensing technology from humans, and 
subsequently to AGIs cross-licensing with each other. 
I believe a pluralistic, competitive, market-based system includes the following benefits. Private, 
decentralized authority is less likely to become corrupted across the board or hacked, either digitally 
or by physical spying as in the Manhattan Project, than a central authority, and is less likely to be 
hijacked by a special interest or power-seekers. History shows that in many or most cases, a market 
system evolves solutions faster and better than centralized state systems. Further, state systems may 
respond innovatively and less bureaucratically when subjected to competition with market systems; 
the Human Genome Project and current space-exploration efforts are examples. A market optimally 
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distributes problems to be solved and computing power assigned to solve them in a highly 
decentralized manner.  
There are valid arguments against an AI IP regime with ‘restricted’, information flow via license, 
whether through market or state. Progress may be slowed, and some persons with no reason to be 
prevented from accessing some AI technology may be restricted. The counter-argument is that AGI 
technology and many of its components are as dangerous or more dangerous than nuclear, 
biological, chemical, or other mass destruction weapons technology (WMD), since AGI will 
control WMD tech, along with innumerable other resources that can fatally or significantly affect 
humanity (Proposition 1 in Appendix).  
By way of example, assume there exists an algorithm critical for AI self-programming. With free 
access to the self-programming algorithm, malevolent humans, as well as extant autonomous AIs, 
could use that technology for unlimited self-improvement, opening a positive-feedback-driven 
Pandora’s box to unlimited malevolence and unlimited means to achieve it (ASILOMAR Principle 
22 [12]). Others point out dangers of a freely available ‘just add goals’ AGI [2, 3]. Thus state, 
private, or a hybrid means of restricting access to critical pieces of AI tech, as with WMD, seems 
to be a necessary axiom to align AI with human interests. 
2. Ethics stored in a distributed ledger 
I define ethics as the fundamental value system from which autonomous entities derive their 
decisions and choices. Ethics are separate from morality, which is a particular set of ethics. ‘Honor 
among thieves’, ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’, ‘professional courtesy’, 
‘honor thy father and mother’, etc., are ethics, as are Asimov’s three laws of robotics [30]. Ethics 
can seem good or bad, moral or immoral, from a volitional entity’s subjective value system. An 
entity’s fundamental values are embedded in some type of behavior (input/output) control system. 
For example consider ethics represented and controlled by a behavior tree [31] where the ethics are 
a subset of its roots, and thus in that sense fundamental.  
The intention of storing AGI ethics via DLT is to permit a class of autonomous entities to have 
identical ethics and to render them visible and unable to be hacked, altered or deleted. In this sense, 
ethics is a necessary component of the control system and allows for different sets of ethics to be 
instantiated. While it is not possible for all humans to have identical values and therefore moral 
values (however defined), DLT, in theory, permits a universal set of immutable values to be 
instantiated in AGIs while still permitting an unlimited range of individual AGI and AI diversity.  
Transparent instantiations of ethics as a requirement for AGI systems conforms to IBM’s call for 
Supplier’s Declarations of Conformity for AI [32] and could be stored in the Configuration Item 
(see below). 
3. Morality defined as voluntary vs. involuntary exchange 
Down through the ages there are two main problems with discussions of morality — first, 
ambiguity and therefore confusion. How can we identify moral behavior if it is imprecisely defined 
and hard to determine [33]? And so such definitions are costly, in terms of the economics of law, 
to enforce. Second, nearly all morality descriptions are subjective, amounting to one person’s value 
system imposed on others, and via coercion if enforced via the state.  
For example, take the proposal of directing AGI to ensure ‘hedonistic consequentialism’ for all of 
humanity — selecting from a set of actions the one that would produce the best balance of pleasure 
versus suffering [2]. Such idealistic but vague and minimally-thought-out concepts of morality — 
which is nearly all of them — may sound good on paper but break down rapidly on implementation. 
And they all amount to a minority or individual — human or AGI, and even from the most 
beneficent of us — deciding what is ‘moral’ or not, or what is ‘best’ for others. When AGI is a 
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given, the proposals depend on its super-intelligence somehow overcoming the limitations of 
humans’ concepts of morality, how to define and implement it, and/or overcome humans’ inability 
to read minds. And notably, they all amount to confining computation of an overall system solution 
to a restricted subset of all computationally active agents, which is another way of saying allowing 
a subset of volitional entities to impose their subjective, not absolute, value system, upon others. 
The essence of autonomy or volition is choice-making. Herein, first, all individual choices that 
affect no other volitional entity are moral. Second, all voluntary exchanges are moral. But if two 
autonomous agents prefer a transaction between them, and that transaction is prevented by a third 
party, that party has imposed its value system over the others. It is also one less computational 
experiment the entire system performs. 
Several economists posited that there is no universal theory or method to determine value, rather, 
all human values and the measure of utility are subjective [34]. Following this premise, defining 
morality as all voluntary transactions is scientific when science is likewise defined as a procedure 
that filters for absolutes — what we all see in common, such as the speed of light — from a vast 
sea of relative views [35, 36]. Later members of the Austrian school defined morality as non-
interference with property (defined to include ones’ body and intellectual property) [35, 37]. It is 
simpler and less costly to define moral transactions as voluntary transactions than to try to identify 
what is property and to define and figure out property boundaries and property interference. One 
of the goals of a legal system is to resolve conflicts in an economically efficiently manner [38]. 
To wit, want to upload your mind and join a collective intelligence? Or would you prefer to stay 
physically human, and not even accept lifespan enhancement? It’s up to you. But under this system 
you, and AGI, cannot force choices on anyone else even if you or AGI believe it is best for them. 
But what if a super-intelligence could make some or all of your decisions better than you can [2]? 
You can have that choice as well. Sign on with the super-AI that seems to best fit your values and 
goals. It’s your choice, just like taking the advice of a consultant or hiring an agent for a specified 
set of tasks today.  
This definition and axiom may not solve the problem of AGI with vast knowledge of the evolution 
of our psychology and innate choice-making algorithms [39, 40] and the propensity to manipulate 
us with that knowledge, although the argument can be made that with such knowledge in a 
voluntary exchange system, AGI would be more able to offer ‘good’ choices (i.e. as we perceive 
them) to us than without that knowledge. 
AGIs will have a larger and more complex set of value preferences than ours; what will be the 
morality of their interaction with each other? The voluntary transaction definition may fit their 
behavior as well. A system of voluntary transactions ensures Pareto optimality and maximizes 
computational experiments driven by local, subjective preference systems. 
4. Behavior control system  
At one end of the knowledge representation/control spectrum is a ‘flat’ set of large numbers of 
heuristical condition-action rules that are selected, not based on general principles, but on matching 
specified patterns. At the other end of the spectrum is a strict postulatory-deductive tree in which 
the internal node ‘beliefs’ are logically derived from the postulates as are the actions represented 
at the leaf-nodes. A postulatory-deductive system is the ideal contemplated here, which would 
satisfy the need for control, the desire for transparency of its operation, and part of the need for 
formal proof of its reliability. However, it is an ideal. Any type of hierarchical control system that 
can hold values at its highest levels and is transparent enough to reveal control over behavior by 
values is a candidate for aligning AGI and human values, and the ecology of value systems that 
will evolve from the initial sets.  
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I believe humans innately attempt to form postulatory-deductive systems using non-mathematical, 
ad hoc ‘logics’ [39, 40] in an effort to organize their world-view into causes and effects, and general 
principles governing specialized condition-action pairs. Mathematical and scientific postulatory-
deductive systems are recent, specialized, powerful cases, an improvement built on the general-
purpose cognitive architecture, in which universally-valid logic replaces the ad hoc evolutionary 
‘logics’ and the entire system is validated through repeated observations directly confirming the 
postulates or indirectly via observation of valid derivatives (i.e. predictions) that never fails. 
Further, in the ritualized transparency of its methods and crowd-sourced validation via multiple 
subjective observers, science is rendered an absolute voluntary consensus (not confirmation of an 
illusory ‘objective’ world) [36] and resembles DLT. 
In the innate human system a causatory cascade of beliefs and actions stem from the fundamental 
beliefs (postulates, including values). Outside of the mathematical and scientific postulatory 
systems a more complex set of relative and subjective ‘logics’ connects beliefs — efficacious from 
an evolutionary standpoint but also unreliable across different contexts [39, 40] (which holds for 
mathematicians and scientists, too, outside of mathematical and scientific contexts). 
An AI control system that may be able to represent current and future postulatory-deductive 
systems is the behavior tree [31].  
All human decisions stem from a hypothesis that the decision will ultimately lead to an 
improvement in the human’s state, as defined internally and subjectively by its value system. This 
is the pursuit of happiness [35]. This same concept can be extended to machines with subjective 
value systems. 
5, 6. Unique component IDs, Configuration Item (CI)  
Several technological and business process developments lead toward a universally-interconnected 
system that self-configures, self-diagnoses its component failures, and repairs them automatically; 
in toto, a paradigm whose ultimate use will be integration into the human-AGI ecology. 
Unique identification (ID) numbers evolved as an economically-efficient means to organize and 
validate property exchanges, contributing to a stable society, starting with large or important pieces 
of property such as real estate via book and page of a recorded deed, automobiles via title or vehicle 
ID number, stocks via CUSIP number, etc. As the cost of creating unique ID numbers decreased 
via technology, the system extended to machines and devices via model and serial numbers, and 
more recently to any product via one- and two-dimensional bar and matrix machine-readable codes 
to facilitate supply-chain management, quality control, customer service, and other functions.  
The transition from the internet of computers to the ‘internet of things’ (IoT) envisions ubiquitous 
communication and computation connecting physical devices with the digital world via 
miniaturized sensors and chips containing only as much computing power and energy usage that is 
needed to perform their intended functionality in their context — “a self-configuring network that 
is much more complex and dynamic than the conventional internet” [41]. In the IoT ID numbers 
become digital as well as physical, e.g. radio frequency ID codes. In the IoT world AGI will be 
able to communicate with, and potentially control, any digital or physical device. 
The IoT world was presaged by the development of disaster recovery and business continuity 
planning, and the key role of configuration items in them. Disaster recovery (DR) arose on the 
realization that the cost of not doing contingency planning for disasters (a hazardous material spill, 
hurricane, tornado, power outage, etc.) could vastly exceed the cost of such planning, including 
total business loss. Judicious planning for disasters, such as foreseeing an alternate location from 
which to conduct operations in the event of facility downtime and establishing redundant 
communication protocols to coordinate team response to disasters, are relatively inexpensive 
insurance measures. Business continuity planning (BCP) logically arose from DR, extending the 
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DR premise of disaster planning to pre-planned, prioritized responses to all component failure, 
including normal end of service life. For example, recovery of failed email for the company as a 
whole is accorded lower priority than for customer-service representatives and top management. 
BCP’s goal is, through contingency planning, to reduce the internal and external impact of business 
process downtime to a minimum. 
The configuration item (CI) arose in BCP/DR conceptually as a system component’s on-board 
algorithm and parameter set that allowed computers and components to detect each other’s 
configuration requirements, automatically configure the component, or perform error-detection, 
reporting, and correction. In the context of DLT, it becomes a smart contract. 
Many paths to dangerous AI, including much of the broad class of human-AI value misalignment, 
are a result of improperly configured or failed components, or sabotage (e.g. accidental nuclear 
war, failure of safeguard components, inadvertent security vulnerabilities leaving a system open to 
hacking, misconfiguration of software modules e.g. in autonomous vehicles, power blackouts, 
financial system meltdowns, etc.). Thus the paradigm of BCP/DR and CIs will be integral to 
maintaining the fidelity of AGI-human value alignment amidst the IoT of the future. Further, CIs 
of critical AGI components can be encoded via DLT, thus greatly reducing or eliminating the 
possibility of unauthorized use, corruption, failure, etc. 
IBM’s Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity to ensure AI safety [32] could be incorporated into 
CIs and used as one pre-requisite for deployment of an AGI system or component.  
7. Digital identity via distributed ledger technology. 
Restricting access to potentially dangerous technology (Axiom #1) necessitates identity 
verification. Few readers would deny the need of multi-factor authentication for nuclear missile 
launch codes.  Identity verification is currently accepted for access to military bases, high-tech 
weapons, aircraft, most private and public buildings, financial systems, health records, and other 
data that individuals consider private for their own reasons, all toward the goal of ensuring a safe 
and secure world. 
In contrast to a third-party-based identity authentication system such as state- or private company-
issued ID cards, many decentralized DLT-based methods have been created, competing with the 
trusted-third-party method to reduce the chance of forgery or other hacking, and bribery or other 
corruption. In a DLT version of the current public-key encryption-based X.509 standard [42], a DL 
replaces the third-party issuing authority in its components: certificate version, serial number, type 
of algorithm used to sign the certificate, issuing authority, validity period, name of entity being 
verified, and entity’s public key .  
Initially, digital identity verification will be done on humans matching biometrics such as facial 
features, fingerprint, voice, in addition to SMS etc., but as AI evolves, AGIs will use technology 
and techniques that they develop against evolving threats to hack verification of humans, e.g. 
speech synthesis or video manipulation [3] and threats that are currently unforeseeable. 
8. Smart contracts based on digital ledger technology 
Smart contracts were conceived by Szabo decades ago, before the inventions of DLT and IoT that 
enable their inexpensive implementation, to automate contractual clauses via cryptography that can 
be self-executing and self-enforcing [43]. Smart contracts as an integral part of DLT are “scripts 
residing on a blockchain that automate multi-step processes” [27]. Szabo’s inspirations were the 
original commercial security transaction protocols: SWIFT, ACH, and FedWire for electronic 
funds transfer, credit card point of sale terminals, and the Electronic Data Interchange for 
transactions between large corporations such as purchase and sale [29]. He used the simple example 
Safe AGI via Distributed Ledger Technology 
P a g e  17                                                     © 2 0 1 9  K r i s t e n  W .  C a r l s o n  
 
of a vending machine, through which transactions are performed without a third-party intermediary 
to verify that the terms of the transaction have been satisfied.  
Two critical design goals were to make verifying satisfaction of contractual terms computationally 
cheap and breaching terms computationally expensive, both of which are realized in a far superior 
generalized manner via DLT than via prior methods (reminiscent of Bush’s and Nelson’s 
conception of hyperlinking before the invention of the internet [44]). Smart contracts require the 
digital specification of obligations each party must meet to trigger a transaction, a blockchain for 
consensus verification that each party has met its obligation, an immutable audit trail of 
transactions, and the goal of excluding collateral effects on non-contractual parties. 
Omohundro envisions smart contracts interfacing autonomous agents with the heterogeneity of 
human legal codes and future legal codes designed to help ensure safe AI interactions with humans 
[45]. Pierce envisions a mass migration of the current compliance regime via law and regulation to 
an economically more efficient and secure regime based on smart contracts [46]; such a system 
greatly facilitates Omohundro’s. 
As AGI evolves beyond our understanding and visibility, and notably when it hits ‘escape velocity’ 
— exponential evolution culminating in generations succeeding each other in fractions of a second 
— prescribed, automated smart contracts will be essential to perpetuating ethical values in each 
successive generation. The concept is that a more advanced AGI generation cannot succeed a less-
advanced one without licensing key components — certain algorithms, hardware, the axiom-
methods proposed herein, behavior control systems invented by humans and AI, etc. — from the 
less-advanced generation, subject to satisfying its value system and oversight. 
The configuration ‘handshake’ between an AGI and its component CIs is a smart contract between 
them, and the intelligence of those handshakes can increase in the future. CIs must incorporate the 
ability to deny activation of a component within a system, or shut it down, if lack of satisfaction of 
a given clause, or violation of a clause, of any extant contract is detected by any distributed ledger 
stakeholder in the transaction. All such contractual stakeholders must be silenced just as living cell 
cycle checkpoints must be silenced for the cell to progress through the intricately orchestrated 
process of mitosis, otherwise it self-destructs [47]. More of these ‘deadman switches’ that actively 
suppress unauthorized use or malfunctioning AI will increase a secure evolution of benign AI; for 
example the limited term of digital identity certificates that expire and require re-verification of the 
subject entity’s identity at regular intervals [42]. 
Szabo’s vision of embedding smart contracts in objects [29] is realized by embedding CIs in all 
non-trivial interconnected devices and algorithms in the IoT. In this manner the smart contract and 
preceding axiom-methods work in concert to ensure human-AGI value-alignment and AGI 
containment within bounds that are benevolent for humans and the succession of AGI generations. 
9. Decentralized applications (dApps) 
DLT-based decentralized applications (dApps) differ from conventional application programs in 
that they 1) are outside the overview and control of a central authority such as a company making 
the app or state agency controlling it, 2) operate on a peer-to-peer network instead of a centralized 
one, and 3) do not have a central point of failure — they are redundant in hardware and software 
and therefore fault-tolerant [48]. Smart contracts are an example of dApps, as are decentralized 
versions of exchanges to trade various types of goods or services, notably intellectual property, 
which can transition into exchanges between AGIs, social media including networking, 
communications protocols, prediction markets, and a growing number of DLT-enabled 
applications.  
Axiom 1, Access to Technology via Market License, requires that some dApps — notably those 
that are critical to AGI — would be implemented via permissioned DLs, which are DLs with an 
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added control layer that can prevent unrestricted and unauthenticated public access. Some 
cryptocurrency observers feel any type of control that is not fully ‘public’ violates the 
decentralization principle; however, consider ‘private’ DLs as a critically important tool in the DLT 
toolbox. For example, should we not consider delegating control over access to critical AGI 
algorithms to a consensus of signatories committed to the goal of AI-human value alignment or 
ethical use of AI, e.g. ASILOMAR AI Principles [12]? Further, the control layer, in part or 
eventually in toto, can be automated by incorporating smart contracts and/or smart tokens to reduce 
the probability that central control can be hacked or corrupted. Smart contract terms could require 
2/3 or 100% acceptance of DLT-authenticated (Axiom 6) signatories to ASILOMAR AI Principles 
or similar regulatory documents. Smart contract terms can deny access to those who do not fulfill 
a transparency requirement via Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity [32], which document could 
in turn require inclusion of an accepted set of ethics and morality (Axioms, 2, 3) and a safety testing 
record meeting certain standards [18, 49], all of which can be incorporated into a CI (Axiom 5). 
Equally critical, dApps permit separation and balance of powers of key AGI components, 
analogous to no one entity having all the nuclear launch codes. The significance of dApps for 
ensuring benevolent AGI is discussed further in two malignant use cases it addresses, the Rogue 
Programmer and Singleton AGI, below. 
Two levels of permissioned access to dApps may be needed: 1) access for use, and 2) access to 
modify the code (while, again, a purist view of dApps sees their development as open-sourced). A 
similar consideration must be given to AGI technology patents. The primary purpose and 
requirement of patents is to ‘teach the art’ clearly and explicitly so the innovation can be 
implemented by the reader. The patent system at a meta-level has largely been denied market 
evolution to try other purposes and requirements. Be that as it may, to facilitate safe free exchange 
of information, a ‘Transportation Security Administration’-type of pre-screening for access to 
critical AGI patents may be needed to prevent access by malevolent entities and may be efficiently 
implemented via smart tokens. 
If no formal proof of benevolent AGI methodology is possible or available soon, sandbox 
simulations of new AGI technology are critical to our future and implementing them via dApps 
will be essential to ensure they cannot be hacked or corrupted by humans or AGIs [49]. 
10. Audit trail of component usage stored via distributed ledger technology 
DLT is inherently a low-cost, redundant, decentralized, hack-free audit trail — a significant 
improvement on traditional centralized audit trail technology. An unhackable audit trail of critical 
AI components such as collaborative, self-learning, or self-programming algorithms will facilitate 
rapid, efficient detection of their authorized or unauthorized use (i.e. a hack of a contract, a set of 
ethics, or an identity verification) and increase probability of remedying the system fault. The IBM 
Research Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity via a factsheet for AI software incorporates an audit 
trail as a fundamental principle [32]. Bore et al. describe a system for incorporating an audit trail 
in DLT as part of embedding AI simulations in DLT so that trust in the simulations’ validity is 
enabled between researchers without requiring a trusted intermediary [49]. 
11. Social ostracism 
As various writers point out, a ‘power-hungry AGI’ or ‘AGI pursuing world domination’ implies 
a AGI attempting to access and control an ever-increasing amount of society’s resources [2, 3, 19, 
20]. Therefore, the ability for entities to deny societal resources to an errant AGI is a counterforce 
on its ambitions. This voluntary mechanism is another aspect of a market economy in which 
computation is distributed, local, and optimized — each entity makes its own choice based on its 
own unique, subjective experience. A further optimization is that market votes can occur as often 
as each entity wishes to change its choice, such as denying its resources to another entity or 
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collection of entities. Market votes occurs immeasurably more often than political votes and 
implement a far more fluid and asymptotically Pareto-optimal society. 
In the current technology for ‘democracy’ the political vote is the means to reach consensus, which 
is tallied by a central authority and enforced via coercion by the same entity. In contrast, voluntary 
concerted boycotts of companies, facilitated by modern social media, are increasingly affecting 
corporate policy (corporations being one type of voluntary association among individuals for their 
mutual benefit).  
DLT is a fundamentally new way to reach and archive a consensus. DLT-based unhackable 
petitions can be smart contracts to facilitate denial of resources to an errant AGI and can be rapidly 
implemented via CIs. For instance, IBM’s call for Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity to help 
ensure safe AI implies voluntary adoption [32], but would be more effective if enforced via social 
ostracism and implemented automatically via CI incorporation, just as web browser security 
currently can alert a user to reject non-security-credentialed (non-https) internet domains, thereby 
immediately denying them the user’s resources.  
The ASILOMAR principles, currently signed by 1273 AI workers [12], are a significant first step, 
like a letter of intent, toward a necessary, more binding and important agreement. A next step could 
be archiving the ASILOMAR agreement and its signatories via DLT so that the principles cannot 
be hacked and can only be amended via consensus of the signatories. A further step could be 
embedding the document and signatories in the Supplier’s Declaration as a second, more restricted 
layer of access protection. Another step would be automatically-triggered, smart contract DLT-
based petitions attached to the Supplier’s Declaration, denying a given set of AGI access to 
specified AGI technology in response to detected AGI behavior contradicting the ASILOMAR 
principles.  
Should AI Research and Technology Be Freely Available While Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical Weapons Research Are Not? 
The Rogue Programmer Problem 
The Rogue Programmer problem assumes that one amoral, misguided, naïve, or malevolent 
individual could make the single advance generating AGI, and this risk depends on how close the 
technology is to a single leap causing ‘take-off’. History shows that all innovations will occur in a 
matter of time, some taking more time than others. For instance, differential calculus was invented 
by Newton in the spring of 1665 and by Leibniz in the fall of 1675 [50]. The historical record is 
clear that what appear in retrospect to be great innovative leaps are actually the final step built on 
stronger antecedents than are assumed in scientific mythology, and in fact a chain of them involving 
many individuals [51]. Perhaps most pertinent to the advent of AGI is the detonation of the atomic 
bomb by the U.S. on 16 July 1945, then by the U.S.S.R. on 29 August 1949. The fusion bomb was 
detonated by the U.S. on 1 November 1952 and by the U.S.S.R. on 22 November 1955, an event 
that was accelerated by spying, which of course is a possibility with AI research [52, 53]. 
Such science and technology feats are large-scale group efforts. The Rogue Programmer problem 
arises when one individual circumvents the consensus agreement of end usage permission by the 
contributors to his/her technology (e.g. the 1273 AI worker signatories to the ASILOMAR 
principles [12]). 
Two recent examples of rogue programmers are worth noting. A Chinese scientist used gene-
editing techniques — developed elsewhere and made freely available in the spirit of the free 
exchange of ideas and technology — to change the genes of human eggs in vitro [54]. The 
innovation escaped overview, was motivated by ambition and pecuniary desire, and ignored a 
variety of the scientific community’s publicly-voiced, well-thought-out but unenforceable 
concerns. Second, recently an AI programmer claimed his robot, which applied for and received 
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citizenship in Saudi Arabia, would achieve human-level intelligence within 5 – 10 years [55]. His 
apparent variety of noble and possibly naïve motivations suggest that, even if he was not capable 
of making the innovation he pursues, he would combine innovations by others to achieve and claim 
the first human-level AI. 
The problems, then, are unenforceable restrictions in a regime of ‘free exchange of ideas and 
technology,’ including public patents, and the lack of reliable means to measure how far away, in 
time or succession of innovations, we are from AGI. 
Measuring the Progression to AGI 
How urgent is the need to develop AGI-human value alignment technology? Can that debate be 
grounded in empirical data? Opinions differ on the timing to AGI — as of 2015 there were over 
1300 published predictions [56]. Timing predictions affect the urgency of preparing AGI-human 
alignment and control, which influences the resources we should devote to that effort. For this and 
other reasons it would be helpful to measure progress to AGI in time or in successions of specific 
AGI-enabling technologies [57], including the positive-reinforcement, recursive self-improvement 
abilities such as self-teaching, collaboration, self-programming, etc.  
Akin to bottom-up versus top-down economic forecasting, a method that captures and compiles 
many local, informed assessments is polling AI experts [56, 58].  A second bottom-up approach is 
taken in the McKinsey Global Institute report, which assesses AI progress by its value-added to 
business processes using industry leader interviews and analytics [59].  
A third approach, a hybrid of bottom-up and empirical metrics, is the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation crowd-sourcing technical progress metrics [60]. A fourth approach, empirical in 
concept, is taken in the AI Index 2018 Annual Report, a set of metrics intended to ‘ground the AI 
conversation in data’ divided into categories: Volume of Activity, Derivative Measures, Technical 
Performance, Towards Human Performance, and Recent Government Initiatives and using such 
metrics as numbers of papers published, course enrollment, conference participation, robot 
software downloads, robot installations, Github ratings, AI startups, venture capital funding, job 
demand, number of patents, adoption by industry and company department, and mentions in 
corporate earning commentary [4]. 
AGI Development Control Analogy with Cell-Cycle Checkpoints 
Biological cell division is a complex and carefully-orchestrated process. Part of the insurance 
against cancer and other disorders resulting from defective replication is an ancient and strongly-
conserved and evolved set of checkpoints that require fidelity tests to be passed in order for the cell 
to pass successive stages of division [47]. A notable feature of the checkpoints is their ‘deadman 
switch’ setup, i.e., rather than listening for signals of defects and then emitting signals to halt the 
process, their default mode is to send signals that suppress entering the next stage and require active 
silencing by successfully passing the fidelity tests. The analogy for AGI evolution is a set of active, 
not passive, checkpoints that halt or delay further AGI progress until certain safety criteria 
established by a consensus of researchers (human or AGI) are met.  
Intelligent Coins of the Realm 
A fundamental difference between today’s money and cryptocurrencies is that the latter can be 
‘intelligent’, i.e. can be endowed with more functionality than a simple token representing 
mutually-agreed-upon or fiat-enforced value. For example, a common AGI malevolent path is 
achieving world domination, inadvertently or deliberately, by commanding an exorbitant share of 
resources, e.g. Bostrom’s paper-clip disaster [2]. Omohundro considers how universal AGI drives 
may be engendered and reasons that since most goals require physical and computational resources 
unlimited resource acquisition may be an example [11]. ‘Open-ended self-improvement’ is another 
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possible universal drive example [3, 20]. In biological systems, cell-doubling is a potentially 
dangerous path to deleterious claim on resources, and cancers are a collection of such paths. It is 
worth noting, analogous to AGI evolution, that biological evolution has found hundreds of 
cancerous paths, many using re-programming to avoid cell-cycle checkpoints, and resistance to 
treatments is real-time exploration of new paths using various genetic algorithms [47, 61, 62].  
As stated, the axioms provide checks, in some cases redundantly, against this danger path. An 
additional check and/or means of implementation could be requiring a specialized token to purchase 
server time or rent AGI technology that automatically looks for the requester’s compliance with 
AGI safety agreements and standards, otherwise the requester’s ‘credit’ is denied. The token’s DL 
then records the secure audit trail including measures of resources requested and protects against 
hacking to hide the evidence. Signals of possible dangerous activity, such as exponentially-
increasing requests for resources by the same or related entities, could be incorporated into the 
token’s programming. More broadly still, Omohundro cites the vision of a plethora of smart tokens 
performing intermediation of value and contractual obligations between the Internet of Things and 
humans [45]. 
The Need for Simulation of Control and Value Alignment 
Considerable effort has gone into analyzing how to design, formulate, and validate computer 
programs that do what they were designed to do; the general problem is formally undecidable. 
Similarly, exploring the space of theorems (e.g. AGI safety solutions) from a set of axioms presents 
an exponential explosion. 
A possible solution is to create a safe ‘sandbox’ environment where, iteratively and with parameter 
sweeps, simulations can be performed and improvements made to control and value alignment 
systems until the principles resulting in robust performance validating our design intent can be 
induced. 
Critiques of the sandbox strategy includes: 1) AGI faking benign goals or obedience in the sandbox 
and then pursue its actual goals when released; 2) AGI hacking out using superior technology, 
developed while in captivity if needed, and most generally, 3) ‘juvenile’ AGI behavior in the 
sandbox that fails to predict bad behavior of a more advanced AGI into which it evolves [2]. To 
address #1 and #2, we need a control system that is effective enough and transparent enough to 
prevent those paths, such as through Axioms 2 and 3, transparent and unhackable ethics and 
morality, and Axiom 4, the behavior tree value system. Bore et al. take the goal of transparent 
simulation and modeling to a new level by describing a system wherein simulation specifications 
and an audit trail are stored via DLT, thus facilitating a means to cross-validate simulations before 
deployment and obstruct malicious hacking or fraud in simulations by humans or AI [49]. Sandbox 
problem #3 may be redressed with the separation and balance of powers described next. 
A Singleton versus a Balance of Powers and Transitive Control Regime 
Bostrom defined ‘singleton’ as a single AGI possessing a decisive strategic advantage over humans 
and other AIs; a single world-dominant decision-making agency at the highest level [2]. Even if a 
consistent axiom set is possible that solves the AGI deception and hacking problems and others, 
such a set may not be sufficient to solve the problem of the singleton. The solution proposed below 
also addresses the proposition that ensuring most AGI are safe to humans is not sufficient and that 
all AGI must be rendered safe [33]. The axioms proposed herein presuppose that we cannot foresee 
how the evolution of AGI may outgrow the axiom set and the technology and techniques used to 
implement them.  
Further, if simulation cannot conclusively demonstrate a solution to the singleton problem, then 
evolving the methods used to ensure moral, benign AGI along with AGI intelligence must be 
delegated to a consortium of AGIs whose values are aligned with humanity’s. The idea is that a 
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beneficent value and control system will evolve along with AGI and each generation consisting of 
multiple, cross-check-and-balance AGIs will, out of self-interest, endow the succeeding generation 
with the latest value and control version. Here ‘generation’ means a set of AGIs incorporating a 
significant technological advance over a prior set of AGIs. If there is only one AGI, it seems more 
likely that an aberrant or errant version could emerge, while if there are, e.g. 500 AGIs in a 
generation that are competing pluralistically, as in markets and government based on separation 
and balance of powers, to win the DLT consensus to unlock the next generation-enabling AGI 
technology, it seems far less likely. 
Thus what may lock in the transitive endowment of improved control and value alignment 
technology between successive AGI generations is storing the technology enabling the next 
generation via dApps in the blockchain and requiring multiple AGIs to reach a consensus to unlock, 
license, and use the tech, including control and value alignment, to succeeding AGI generations. In 
this manner hacking the blockchain, or attempting to coerce individual consensus agents, would be 
thwarted in the same way as it is done in the nascent DL methodology extant today. In addition, 
game theoretic design approaches may help ensure stable evolutionary strategies, likely a 
succession of them (dynamic equilibrium) [24, 25, 63]. In that context note there can be no Nash 
equilibrium with one overwhelmingly dominant player.  
Prima facie, an entirely different way to put the principle underlying safe AGI solution to the 
singleton problem is to think of future AGI as a distributed automaton, and to recall von Neumann’s 
solution to designing a reliable automaton from unreliable parts via redundancy [64]. Critical AGI 
algorithms may reside on multiple agents in one or more generations, who require consensus for 
ongoing access and cross-check each other in real time (like a deadman’s switch). 
Conclusion and Future Work 
One epochal event likely to trigger AGI, if not the key event, is AI self-programming, or any other 
self-improvement, positive-feedback advancement. Close attention should be given to that 
development path, progress metrics and simulations developed, and measures enacted to ensure 
that access to key self-improvement techniques is via licensing with appropriate safeguards. 
Before self-improvement technology can be unleashed, AI behavior control systems need to be 
developed and tested in transparent, non-hackable simulation sandbox environments as proposed 
by Bore et al. [49] seems essential.  
If the ASILOMAR AI Principles [12] or similar agreements are akin to the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence, we need to move to the ‘Articles of Confederation’, step up the current ‘Federalist 
Papers’ stage, and then move to enact the ‘Constitution’, i.e. firm and ineluctable consensuses 
among leading AI workers, encrypted via DLT, as are possible. 
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Appendix: Simple Syllogisms to Help Formalize the Problem Statement 
Proposition 1, Probability of Malevolent Use: With no restriction on AGI technology flow via 
licensing, malevolent use of AGI is a certainty. 
Safe AGI via Distributed Ledger Technology 
P a g e  23                                                     © 2 0 1 9  K r i s t e n  W .  C a r l s o n  
 
Proof: Assume: 1. There exist malevolent or incompetent humans. 2. They can freely access AGI 
technology (e.g. via an AGI app offering ‘just add goals’). Then: There will exist malevolent use 
of AGI. 
Corollary 1A: With no restriction on technology flow via licensing, malevolent AGI will destroy a 
significant portion of humanity, or the entire species. 
Proof: Assume in addition to 1 & 2: 3a. Some malevolent humans would employ AGI for mass 
destruction; 3b. Some would seek mass destruction of the entire species.  
Corollary 1B: With no restriction on technology flow via licensing, there is a chance that 
malevolent AGI may destroy the entire species. 
Proof: Assume in addition to 1, 2 & 3: 4. Some malevolent humans are incompetent in their 
attempts to contain their destructive goals.  
Corollary 1C: The more widely available and easily accessible the destructive AI or AGI, the 
higher the probability of its deliberate or inadvertent destructive use. 
Proposition 2, Extent of Danger, Importance of Containing: Containing AGI is more important 
than containing nuclear weapon usage.  
Proof: Assume AGI will have control, by deliberate human consent and design, by accident, or by 
AGI intervention, over nuclear weapons, and in addition, other critical resources, e.g. power grid, 
transportation systems, financial systems, negotiations between states, etc. Then clearly AGI 
containment is more important than containment of nuclear weapon use. 
Proposition 3, Probability of Value Misalignment: Given the unlimited availability of an AGI 
technology as enabling as ‘just add goals’, then AGI-human value misalignment is inevitable. 
Proof: From a subjective point of view, all that is required is value misalignment by the operator 
who adds to the AGI his/her own goals, stemming from his/her values, that conflict with any 
human’s values; or put more strongly, the effects are malevolent as perceived by large numbers of 
humans. From an absolute point of view, all that is required is misalignment of the operator who 
adds his/her goals to the AGI system that conflict with the definition of morality presented here, 
voluntary, non-fraudulent transacting (Axiom 3), i.e. usage of the AGI to force his/her preferences 
on others. 
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